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Introduction 
The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouzaizi, a Tunis ian fruit vendor, in the front of the 
Sidi Bouzid regional council ignited the most widespread demonstrations the Middle East has 
ever witnessed. During the months that followed demonstrators demanded an end to corrupt 
regimes through both peaceful and vio lent means. In Morocco, swift constitutional action 
suppressed protests. In Egypt, 18 days of protests led to the removal of President Hosni Mubarak 
and the National Democratic Party; the Party 's office was soon replaced by a military regime. 
The protest events of20 1 I and 20 12 wi ll continue to chal lenge Western perceptions of 
the Middle East. The demonstrations forced journalists and scholars to get past images of the 
Cold War mujahedeen, terrorist organizations, and the Iranian nuclear program. During the 
initial months of what some refer to as 'the Arab Spring,' reporters paraded around the idea that 
the Middle East was sudden ly looking for a liberal democratic solution. They painted portraits of 
secular protestors trying to remove corrupt tyrants. 
Such portraits are misleading partial truths. Religion and social movements continue to 
be closely intertwined, in the Middle East as elsewhere. Devout Muslims across the Middle East 
are finding new ways to carry their beliefs, rituals, and practices over into soc ial movement 
groups. The popular mobilization in the recent Arab Spring is an exce ll ent opportunity to 
explore these new ways. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between 
contemporary Islam and social movement mobilization. How is Islam being carried over into 
every function of a soc ial movement organization? A new generation of protestors has emerged 
in the Middle East, but one thing is for certain: one fruit vendor 's se lf-immo lation, the fa ll of 
oppress ive dictators, and over a year of demonstrations does not unravel the intimate relationship 
between Islam and the millions of devout Muslims living in the Midd le East. 
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Literature Review 
Scholars of Middle Eastern social movements have either overemphasized the structural 
explanations of mobilization or have focused primarily on Islamic ideologies. Iran is often the 
primary example for social unrest in the Middle East. Consequently, many of these scholars 
apply Skocpol' s ( 1979) analysis of French, Russian, and Chinese social movements to Iran's 
1979 revolution. Studies regarding cross-class alliances, modernization, and international 
pressures dominate the literature on Middle Eastern social movements. Out of the three, the 
modernization theory is the most trite. 
When scholars attempt to explain micro-sociological factors of mobilization, they define 
Islam solely as an ideology. Aside from Iran's revolution, the Palestinian Intifada (or uprising) 
and Hamas are the primary examples ofls lamist movements 1• Scholars studying the movement 
focus on the beliefs of Muslim Shi'ites and their anti-Israeli sentiments. However, Islam and its 
relationship to social movements cannot be fu lly understood solely through structural and 
ideological analysis. More importantly, scholars must explain Middle Eastern social movement 
theory independently of Western paradigms. 
Iran and Modernization 
Scholars of, what Jack Goldstone (200 1) calls, the 'third generation of revolutionary 
analyses' discredit modernization. Using the 1848 Sicilian revolution, Tilly (1973) argues: 
Population growth, industrialization, urbanization, and other large-scale structural 
changes do ... affect the probabilities of revolution. But they do so indirectly, by 
shaping the potential contenders for power, transforming the techniques of 
1 Throughout thi s paper 1 refer to Islamist SMOs as groups with exp licitly Islamic ideologies. Non-lslamist groups, 
in contrast, do not refer to Islam directly in their ideology, but may sti ll have been influenced by the religion. 
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governmental control, and sh(fting the resources available to contenders and 
governments. There is no reliable and regular sense in which modernization breeds 
revolution. ( 44 7) 
Modernization can only be the precursor for social instability; it alone cannot ignite a revolution. 
Tilly instead suggests "alternative conceptions of justice ... the formation of coalitions, [and] the 
legitimacy of the state" as prominent causes of unrest (447). While his alternatives include both 
macro and micro-sociological explanations, they dismiss the structural changes attributed to 
modernity, such as industrialization. 
Despite Western social movement literature's de-emphasis on modernization, scholars 
have continued to use the theory to explain Iran during their 1979 revolution. Moving away from 
a traditional agrarian-based society, increasing accessibility to technology, and creating complex 
economic institutions are three ways that Iran has experienced structural transformations in the 
20th century (Skocpol 1994, Denoeux 1993). These changes then led to large-scale discontent 
among Iranians who were forced to adapt to the rapid circumstances. 
The lag between Western and Middle Eastern social movement theory emerges entirely 
as a result of overusing Iran as the primary example of social unrest in the region. Skocpol 
( 1982) is one of many scholars who distinguish Iran's movement as a consequence of rapid 
modernity. While this may have been the case for Iran three decades ago, most Middle Eastern 
countries experienced Western-style economic and social reforms during the 1980s (Bayat, 
2000). If modernity was the primary cause of mobilization, then countries such as Egypt, Libya, 
Lebanon, or Syria would have endured revolutions decades ago. Middle Eastern countries 
experiencing protests today vary tremendously in terms of modernization. Such an explanation 
would, therefore, be inadequate at explaining unrest in the region. 
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Islam as an Ideology 
The second Palestinian intifada and emergence of Hamas as a political power during the 
early 2000s prompted scholars of social movements to focus on Islam as an ideology. The 
movement-triggered by Israel ' s prolonged occupation-exposed the violent tactics oflslamist 
movements in the Middle East. While explaining Hamas as a social movement organization 
(SMO), Robinson (2004) scrutinizes the correlation between the group's Shi'a orientation and 
Hamas's violent tactics. Narratives of the Shiite holy figure, Hussein ibn Ali, and his sacrifice in 
the name of Islam are often tied to the group's suicide attacks. When others insist on the political 
pragmatism ofHamas, they fail to remember Islam's influence over the actions ofthe group 
(Roy 2003). In other words, individuals use Islam to explain group violence yet overlook the 
role of Islam when explaining an SMO 's pragmatism. As a consequence, the SMO's 
relationships with Islam appear to be incoherent. 
Aside from Hamas, a growing library of literature connects Islam to groups solely 
through ideology. Wickham (2002), forming a hybrid of macro and micro approaches, notices: 
In the Muslim world ... the most insistent calls for reform have come not from 
movements favoring secular democracy, but.from those seeking to establish political 
systems based on Islam. Indeed, Islam has eclipsed secular ideologies as the primary 
source of political activism in much ofthe Muslim world (1). 
Islam now influences political change more than ever before. The SMOs that have emerged in 
the most recent uprisings in the region have not been overtly Jslamist in their demands. In other 
words, these SMOs do not directly seek an Islamic state or impose their Islamic ideologies on the 
greater public . 
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Religion and Social Movement Theory 
A distinct gap exists between the study of religion and social movement theory. Christian 
Smith (1996) cites secularization theory, structural-functionali sm, and the lack of inter-discipline 
study between religion and sociology as three factors why religion "has been conspicuously 
under-explored-arguably virtually ignored-in the academic literature on social movements" 
(2). SMOs can tap into religion's resources without expl icitly using its ideologies. Smith uses the 
Civil Rights movement to explain how preachers, because of their acqu ired skill set, became the 
most influential, and readily available, speakers of the movement. He also includes Po land 's 
Solidarity movement and the Anti-apartheid movement. In al l of his examples, religion did not 
play a direct role in the groups ' ideologies or demands. Smith's work uncovers the positive effect 
that religion can have on a group's organizational resources. 
Despite his contribution to the study of social movements and religion, Smith ' s only 
example of Islam is "the Radical Islamic insurgency in the Iran ian revolution" (47). Add ing Iran 
to hi s study provides no novel information regard ing the relationship between Islam and social 
movement theory. The Iranian revolution was also primarily Islamist. The initial goal was an 
Islamic theocracy, and the movement was led by Musl im theologians. Demonstrators believed 
that the West had secu larized the political and social realms of the country. However, none of the 
demonstrations in 20 II aimed for such a goal. The case of Iran provides little, if any, insight to 
how Islam is present in contemporary Midd le Eastern social movements. 
Islam and Social Movement theory: an Alternative 
We must begin to understand the ro le oflslam as a link between an organization 's 
structures, activ ities, and strategies (Munson 2001), much in the way that Smith (1996) does with 
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other religions. Islam is more than an ideological tool to be used by opposition groups. Political 
pundits and journalists prematurely called the 2011 movements secular because ofthe public's 
pro-democratic demands and slogans. Like Christianity in the U.S., Islamic student movements 
in Egypt during the 1970s created a generation of experienced social movement leaders who 
continue to organize both Islamist and non-Islamist movements (Wickham 2011). Consequently, 
Islam may still heavily influence opposition groups and leaders from past generations. 
When cultural frameworks, such as historical values, myths, narratives, and symbols, are 
integrated with ideologies, they provide a better chance for successful mobilization (Goldstone 
2001: 154). During the most recent uprising, a similar ideological 'repackaging' of SMOs in the 
Middle East may have occurred. Groups are taking individuals who have participated in past 
Islamist movements and are integrating them into new social movements aimed at democracy, 
social justice, and freedom. I do not suggest that the SMOs' secular demands are fabricated, but 
instead insist on the persisting influence that Islam has on political activism. 
Islam continues to influence Middle Easterners. Men, women, and children perform daily 
religious rituals and practices. Islamic institutions, historical narratives, and other resources 
continue to exist in Muslim communities. Again, the purpose of my study is to identify how 
Islam has permeated into SMOs' activities, beliefs, and structure in a way that makes Muslims 
comfortable enough to join them. Identifying the specific effects of Islam will allow scholars to 
move away from explanations that link modernization to social unrest in the Middle East. My 
study will also present Islam not only as an ideological source of motivation, but also as a 
provider of organizational resources and an active force that shapes citizen's day-to-day lives. 
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Methodology 
My study wi ll focus on spec ific SMOs in the Midd le East and not the larger nat ional 
movements . Identifying the relationship between Islam and an organ ization is only poss ible if I 
focus on a small number of SMOs. By looking at organizational and leadership structures, 
recruitment and non-protest activ ities, ideologies, and relationships of an SMO, I can identify 
where Islam does and does not exist in today's Middle Eastern SMOs. 
The Countries 
Befo re se lecting the SMOs that would be included in my study, I chose the countries 
in which these SMOs would come fro m. During the early months of 201 1, mass ive 
demonstrations spread throughout the Middle East. In some countries, movements were led by 
established political parties and oppos ition groups. In other movements, however, formal SMOs 
were less present. I se lected countries by looking at a well-known human rights organization, the 
International Crisis Group, and their coverage on the 2011 unrest in the Middle East2. In each 
document within the eight-part series, the organization focuses on the countri es that went 
through unrest, and provides readers with groups that were invo lved in the mobilization of 
protestors. Us ing the report as a guide, I selected Morocco and Egypt as two countries with both 
establi shed and emerging SMOs that were effecti ve at mobi lizing individuals during the 20 II 
protests. 
Each country's unique politica l and social backgrounds prov ide the variabili ty needed 
to better understand where exactly Islam fits into an SMO's functions. For example, Morocco 's 
liberal policies allow Islamist parties, such as the Justice and Development Party, to participate 
2 The International Crisis Group provides an in-depth look at the unrest in the Middle East in their series ' Popular 
Protest in North Afhca and the Middle East' (20 II) 
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in its political realm. This is strikingly different from Egypt, where Islamist political groups 
continue to face repression. In fact, violence in Egyptian protests was relatively high when 
compared to Moroccan demonstrations. Movements within the two countries also differ in their 
consequences. Eighteen days of violent protests in Egypt pressured President Mubarak to resign, 
the National Democratic Party to dismantle, and the parliament to dissolve. The Moroccan 
response, in contrast, included only minor constitutional changes. The variation between 
Morocco and Egypt are significant enough to include them in my comparison. 
The Social Movement Organizations 
I then selected the four SMOs that received the highest newspaper coverage in the 
2011 Arab Spring. I began collecting data from regional, local and international newspapers 
during a period when protests began occurring in more than one major city and no less than three 
times per week. From this point, I selected a four-week time frame for each of the countries, and 
recorded each time an SMO was mentioned during a protest event. I then selected the four 
groups mentioned most by newspapers within the 30-day period. 
The amount of newspaper coverage a group receives reflects their imp011ance within 
protests and their future political significance. Lipsky (1968: 1151) comments on the importance 
of media coverage for an SMO, stating that "If protest tactics are not considered significant by 
the media, or if newspapers and television reporters or editors decide to overlook protest tactics, 
protest organizations will not succeed." Because the group's success is, in part, related to the 
amount of coverage they receive, a simple tally can determine which groups are and will be most 
influential in the future . The most mentioned SMOs were also more likely to have sufficient data 
regarding their organizational structure, recruitment, and other activities. 
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After selecting the four groups (see appendix, Table 1.1) I focused on the SMOs 
themselves rather than the protest events. My primary sources included 65 journal articles, 
human rights reports, book sections, dissertations, and government documents, and 400 
newspaper articles. Using the groups' names as search terms, I selected the first 100 newspaper 
articles for each group. Newspapers included all major world publications available on the 
LexisNexis database. 
The Protocol 
Once I collected the primary source data, I sorted and analyzed the information in each 
document by using a coding protocol and Atlas.ti, a qualitative analysis tool. The protocol 
consists of 17 different 'codes,' or categories (see table 1.2). If I found information that was 
related to a specific category I would link that piece of information to the corresponding code. 
Each piece of information collected is referred to as a quotation. The study included a total of 
2114 quotations across 465 primary documents. 
The protocol is designed to capture data on the four main elements of SMOs that 
scholars have identified as the most important: (I) organizational structure and leadership, (2) 
recruitment and non-protest activities (3) ideologies, ideas and beliefs, and (4) relationships 
among the group, the state, and other SMOs. The neglect that religion has faced within social 
movement studies (Smith 1996) caused scholars to treat religion as a tool for organizers and a 
source of motivation for their followers (Goldstone 200 I). By looking at each SMO's functions 
and their relationship to Islam I hope to move away from the simplistic view that religion is only 
present within a group's ideology. 
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Organizational and Leadership Structures 
The ways in which leaders make decisions and structure their group can be based off 
of Islamic ideas. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood's three-step process to becoming a member 
involved a gradual commitment to the group 's beliefs, while simultaneously isolating each 
member from the rest of society to incubate those ideas (Munson 2001 ). Only glimpses of the 
group ' s ideas were represented to initial recruits, while key members had to be fully immersed 
within it. Another example of an Islam-influenced organizational structure would be Hezbollah ' s 
12-member Majlis al-Shura council, which consists of respected clerics who make the tactical 
decisions for the group. Similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah leaders must be well-
educated in the teachings of the Q ' uran as they move towards leadership positions. Some groups 
may use Islam as both an intellectual and social standard when organizing their structures, while 
other groups may use a political model (coordination committees, presidents, etc.). 
Recruitment and Non-Protest Activities 
Recruitment for SMOs and the activities that a group engages in often take place in 
informal settings (Munson 2008), and are essential for providing a constant flow of new 
members. Public demonstrations, rallies, public services, and vigils are often the way in which 
members are recruited into an SMO. Separating whether Islam does, or does not, exist within a 
group ' s recruitment process was determined by the settings where potential members were 
exposed to the group, and the profile ofthose who recruited them. Organizers who are well 
respected members of the local religious community would be an example of a profile that 
relates to Islam. Similarly, prayers, social service work (zakat), speeches from religious figures, 
and religiously-inspired rhetoric are all examples of what could have been coded under activities . 
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Take away the preexisting Islamic symbols, rituals, and beliefs, and the group would be forced to 
look for alternative ways to attract members. 
Ideologies , Ideas , and Beliefs 
As mentioned in the literature review, ideology is always well presented in scholarly 
work on Islamist groups. Nonetheless, it remains a crucial function of the larger SMO and must 
not be ignored within the study. Ideologies and ideas mean different things to different members. 
Consequently, a group's success may be determined by how potential recruits are first exposed 
to these ideas. The ideology of a group was described in official charters or statements, 
narratives told within the group, goals and demands, and protest slogans. Rhetoric that makes 
references to the Qur'an or major religious figures , such as Ayatollah Khomeini, is clearly 
attached to Is lamic doctrine and tradition. 
Relationships with Other Groups 
An SMO's relationships between other groups, institutions, and political parties affect 
its members ' experiences. Groups that have joint meetings, participate in one another's protests, 
or provide each other with monetary support may allow members to draw from resources across 
groups. Is lamic rituals and practices are two resources that an SMO cou ld provide. For example, 
if an lslamist group cooperates with a left-wing secular SMO during protests by providing any 
religious necessities, the left-wing SMO need not incorporate those aspects of Islam into its 
structure. By providing these essential services, the non-Islamist SMO may redirect its resources 
towards other activities while the re ligious groups provide members with familiar Islamic rituals. 
This would allow individuals to pa1ticipate in familiar religious activities during times of unrest 
and still join groups that don't include Islam within its structure. 
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With an outline of my methods, as well as an in-depth look at the protocol, I will now 
address two possible critiques of my study: choosing newspapers as a primary data source, and 
examining a small number of SMOs. 
Newspapers as a Primary Data Source 
Out of the six primary sources mentioned , newspaper data collection has been the 
most heavily criticized by social movement scholars. Sarah Soule and Jennifer Earl (2004) have 
cited the two most common issues when selecting newspapers: selection and description bias. 
Both authors conclude that selection bias poses a larger problem because of the way news 
agencies select and describe the events covered (69). Hoping to mitigate some of the errors from 
selection bias, I selected all English newspapers availab le on the Lexis Nexis database. This 
approach, the triangulation of sources, has been used effectively in past research (Koopmans & 
Rucht 2002) to cover more news events and reduce selection bias. Local newspapers may report 
more on the individual organizations, while international and regional newspapers focus on 
larger protests. On the one hand , redundancy of the events covered did occur. On the other hand, 
it provided exactly the type of legitimacy that was desired for the study. 
Additional criticism has been cited (Melucci 1994, Earl et. a\. 2004) on what the 
researcher aims to co llect from newspapers. Earl argues that the organizational dynamics of a 
group, such as its structure and recruitment, "might be better addressed with other types of data" 
(Earl et al. 2004: 76). However, this study differs in two ways. Unlike much of the research 
using newspapers (McAdam & Su 2002, Rucht & Ohlemacher 1992), mine examined protests 
that occur outside of the U.S. Because the SMOs in my study came from highly repressive 
countries, limited information about each group was available prior to the current uprisings. As a 
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result, newspaper data made up for the lack of scholarly articles written about such groups . 
Second, research focused not on the protest events themselves, but the activities of SMOs 
involved before, during, and after these events. Because the search terms primarily pertain to 
SMO names and leaders, rather than dates of protests, different results emerged. 
Small-N versus Big-N 
The battle between a small versus large number of case studies is heavily debated 
(Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003). Even so, research containing relatively few case studies has 
heavily influenced work on social movements and revolutions (Earl 2003 , Goodwin 200 I, Parsa 
2000, Skocpol 1979). In both big and small studies, trade-offs related to deterministic and 
probabilistic causal inferences are often made. Because my methodology only contains a total of 
four SMOs across two countries, I consider my approach to be a small-N study. Consequently, 
making the causal inference that Islam has any effect on an organization ' s structure, activities, or 
ideas excludes other independent factors that may be involved . 
Lieberson ( 1991) criticized the smali-N approach, by pointing out its inability to allow 
for deterministic or probabilistic causal inferences. In order for smali-N studies to be 
theoretically sound, Lieberson argues, a study' s method must include "existence of only one 
cause" and "confidence that all possible causes are measured" (315). Using a diverse group of 
SMOs from different Muslim countries has eliminated some of the other factors affecting 
mobilization . More importantly, Lieberson's criticism applies more to deductive studies, such as 
Skocpol ' s (1979) well known work on revolutions. Within her study, she hypothesizes that 
certain structural elements must be present in order for a revolution to occur. My study, however, 
was more inductive in nature. I make no generalizations or overarching hypotheses about the 
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groups at the beginning of the study. Nor do I suggest a definite relationship between Islam and 
the SMO, on the one hand, and the probability of group success on the other. In a small-N study 
that does not set out to provide universal hypotheses, Lieberson's argument holds little 
relevance. 
Lieberson is primarily concerned with studies that infer causality. Again, I make no 
claim of an SMO's success or failure based on the supposed relationship between Islam and a 
group 's functions. Rather, I focus on how the relationship itself is created. Whether a group's 
relationship with Islam subsequently benefits or harms it remains, at most, a secondary purpose 
of my study. 
After collecting 400 newspaper articles, as well as 65 other primary sources, I used a 
qualitative analysis tool, Atlas.ti , to code the data according to the 17 codes from the protocol. I 
do not suggest that these codes, and the functions that they represent, are more important than the 
others. Rather, it indicates the type of information that is most accessible within these groups. It 
also represents the information most important to the media. 
16 
Hatem M. Hassan 
Results 
Because each group has its own political and social backgrounds, I will first 
provide a brief historical sketch of each SMO. Only after mentioning their distinct ideologies and 
historical settings can a comparison be made between each group's relationships with Islam. 
AI Adl Wal Ihsane 
AI Adl Wallhsane, or the Justice and Charity group, began in the early l980s and was 
led by Abd ai-Salam Yassine, a strong opponent of King Hassan II. Like many Islamist groups in 
the Middle East, AI Adl's ideology remains largely anti-Western and anti-Israeli. It is distinct 
from other lslamist due to its Sufi beliefs (Bahaji 20 II). -an Islamic denomination that 
represents less than I% of Muslims globally3• The group suggested that the Moroccan state be 
transformed into an Islamic one. Taking his ideas from historical figures, such as Sayyid Qutb, as 
well as passages from the Qur'an, Yassine suggested that an Islamic transformation could only 
occur through education, organization, propagation, and an uprising ( 42). Yassine also cited 
social injustice, corruption, and equality in his speeches. 
Opposition towards electoral pa1ticipation makes AI Adl a particularly unique SMO 
(Zemni 2011: 88). Despite Yassine's arrest and the illegality ofthe group, AI Adl continues to 
provide social services through its own charity networks (Laskier 2003). However, Yassine 's 
daughter, Nadia, has brought the group closer to the political realm in recent years. 
In 2011, AI Adl gained political power by mobilizing individuals from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds. They initially cooperated with the February 20111 Movement 
(F20M), but later split with the group due to conflicting political demands. 
3 Central Intelligence Agency. (n.d.). The World Factbook (Religions). McLean, VA. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia .gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbooklfields/2122.html 
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February 20th Movement (F20M) 
Also a Moroccan group, albeit a much younger one, is the February 20th movement 
(F20M). Its origins during the 2011 protests relied, although not entirely, on media tools, such as 
Face book and YouTube videos. The group is a large coalition comprised of political parties, 
NGOs, such as the Moroccan Human Rights Association , labor unions (i.e. the Unified Socialist 
movement), Islamists, and members of the Amazigh movement (Maghraoui 2011:687). Given its 
malleable structure and diverse membership, the F20M enjoys ideological flexibility and 
suppo11s pro-democratic liberal policies, such as social justice and economic equality (688). The 
group's membership consists of young students, as well as union workers, doctors, and lawyers. 
As a part of the original organizational structure, AI Adl helped organize protests with the 
F20M in 2011. However, since the drafting of a new constitution, the two groups have drifted 
apm1. Since then, communication problems and a lack of solid organizational structure have 
caused the F20M to lose momentum in mobilizing its members (Molina 2011 :436). 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hasan Al-Banna in 1928 as an opposition 
towards British imperialism in Egypt, making it the oldest and most well-known group on the list 
(Leiken and Brooks 2007: I 08). The group's ideology is rooted in Islam, and is heavily 
influenced by Iranian clerics of the 1979 revolution and the pro-Gaza movement. It originally 
called for an Islamic state, but has recently accepted a form of government that uses Islam as a 
frame of reference (Wickham 2011, Antar 2006). 
r focus on the post-1980s Brotherhood, and distinguish it from the organization that 
operated under Nasser and Sadat. Prior to Mubarak's rule, the Brotherhood spent most of its 
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resources on social services (zakat) and da 'wa, or religious outreach (Wickham 20 II: 206). Most 
of these services were replaced with political activities during the 1980s. A new generation of 
post-Nasser Brotherhood leaders distinguished themselves after officially entering the po litical 
realm with the Wafd party in the 1984 parl iamentary elections (B laydes & El Tarouty 2009: 
368). They did this by actively taking over lawyer, medical, and engineering syndicates (Zahid 
20 I 0). Instead of focusing on the larger Muslim world, the new leadership aimed to change 
Egyptian society through a more moderate approach. 
In 2005 and 2011, the Mus lim Brotherhood joined Kefaya and other political parties in 
protests demanding equality, econom ic and political reforms, and an end to corruption. The 
group received heavy criticism for its delayed support of 'the .January 25 revolution. ' 
Nonetheless, the Brotherhood's Freedom and .Justice Party (F.JP) took 47% of the seats in the 
People's Assembly in 2011.4 
Kefaya 
The Egyptian Movement for Change, also known as Kefaya ('Enough'), was formed in 
2004 by a group of leftists, Nasserites, Islamists, and intellectuals as an anti-Mubarak grassroots 
movement (Oweidat et al. 2008). Like the F20M, Kefaya enjoys ideological flexibility and 
promotes pro-democratic change. The group advocates equality, freedom, and democracy in its 
rhetoric. However, Kefaya's founding charter reveals some anti-Western and anti -Israel i 
sentiment. This is large ly due to its formation during the second Palestinian Intifada and 
American Invasion of Iraq (ai-Sayyid 2009: 50). 
4 Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Party Wins Sweeping Victory in Parliamentary Election. (20 12, January 2 1 ).Voice of 
America. Retri eved from http ://www. voanews.com/engl ish/news/afri ca/Egypts-M usl i m-Brotherhood-Party-Wins-
Sweeping-Victory- in-Parliam entary-Election-1378 17423.html 
19 

Hatem M. Hassan 
Kefaya is credited to have re introduced protesting as political tool during Mubarak's 
repressive regime. This led to several 'for-change ' offshoot groups, such as the 20th March 
Movement for Change, Students for Change, Youth for Change, University Professors for 
Change, Workers for Change, and Artists for Change (Browers 2007: 73) . 
In 2005, the group was joined by the Mus lim brotherhood in their pro-Palestinian rallies. 
In the 2011 protests, however, the group 's mistrust for the Islamist organization made their 
relationship amb iguous . Kefaya's young leaders and their heavy usage of online social 
networking tools made them one of the most influential groups during the fall of the Mubarak 
regime (Wickham 2011). 
With brief historical sketches of each of the four groups completed, I now turn to an 
analysis of the data I collected in each of the four areas considered important to SMOs-(1) 
organizational and leadership structures, (2) recruitment and non-protest activities, (3) 
ideologies, ideas, and beliefs, and (4) relationships with SMOs, political parties, and institutions. 
1. Organizational and Leadership Structures 
My analysis for this section is based on 416 pieces of information I collected on the structure 
and leadership of the four SMOs that comprise this study (see Table l.3a). 
Organizational Structure 
The biggest contrast between the Islamist and non-Islamist SMOs can be seen in their 
organizational structures. Kefaya and the F20M were formed as coalitions (see table 1.5) with 
quasi-independent local committees. Their decentralized structures integrate the ideological 
flexibility of different regions. The Brotherhood and AI Ad l' s rigid structures, in contrast, make 
clear d istinctions between their re li gious and political anns. 
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Decentralized Structures and the Non-Islamists 
Non-Islamist groups are characterized as leaderless and structureless in 16 different 
quotations. A member of the Moroccan Coalition for Parliamentary Monarchy suggests "that the 
[February 20th] movement suffers from weak organization."5 Yet, out of the 16 quotations, only 
one fails to go beyond the ' leaderless ' explanation. 
In reality, the groups appear to be structured on a small scale with general guidance from 
national coordinating committees.6 The F20M is nationally led by a support council but locally 
organized through quasi-independent committees (Roko 2011 ). Similarly, Kefaya consists of an 
inner circle of 35 members responsible for handling research and financia l matters. Its structure 
also includes advisory and coordinating committees that organize day-to-day activities (Oweidat 
et al. 2008). Although the groups' structures are certainly loose, they are neither leaderless nor 
form less. ln fact, the dynamic structures illustrate both groups' abil ity to adapt to an 
ideologically diverse community. 
Labeling these groups as ' leaderless' implies a negative connotation that ignores their 
structural flexibilities. The Creation of local subcommittees responsib le for day-to-day activities 
provides local communities with chances to voice their demands and beliefs. To incorporate 
diverse populations into their movements, both SMOs had to create a structure that would meet 
the needs of their changing environments. The early Muslim Brotherhood's structure was similar 
in its flexibility. Munson (2001: 498) explains how "industrial workers in the Shubra al-Khayma 
district of Cairo .. . had li ttle in common with the traditional Egyptian peasants ... The Mus li m 
Brotherhood's federated structure allowed it to appeal to the parochial orientations of different 
5 For Morocco ' s February 20 reform movement, new constitut ion means rebirth. (20 II , July 6).The National, p. 3. 
Rabat. 
6 British Broadcasting Corporation. (20 II, October 4). Young Moroccan protesters vow to continue action against 
corruption. BBC Monitori ng Middle East, p. 2. Casab lanca. 
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groups and different regions of Egypt." The Egyptian Brotherhood was concerned about the 
ideological and socioeconomic differences across Egypt. These differences continue to exist 
today. By creating loose coalitions and independent subcommittees led by national advisory 
boards, Kefaya and the F20M are able to project their general demands without excluding 
potential Islamist, socialist, Marxist, Nasserite, or liberal members. 
Rigid Structures: Separating the Religious and Political 
In sharp contrast to the non-lslamists, AI Adl and the Muslim Brotherhood created 
distinct arms that carried out separate functions. AI Adl's structure consists of a political and 
spiritual arm, and is led by a Murshid, a Sufi term meaning 'guide' or ' leader' (Maddy-
Weitzman 2003). According to Ottaway and Ri ley (2006), AI Adl's Majlis al Shura "provides 
the political and organizational direction of the movement," wh ile the Majlis al Irchad "provides 
spiritual or ideological guidance" (16). The Brotherhood's structure, although sti ll high ly 
secretive, consists of a 16-member Guidance Office (religious council), a political wing, and a 
charity division (Hamzawy and Brown 20 l 0). The group's po litical arm, referred to as the 
parliamentary bloc, addresses government reform issues, while the General Guide and the 
Gu idance Office controls social and re ligious activities (Hamzawy and Brown 2010: 29). As the 
Brotherhood gained power in the 2005 elections, it created an addition to its political wing 
known as the "parliamentary kitchen." The wing acts as a think tank, gathering data pertaining to 
local economic issues (Shehata 2006). AI Ad! and the Brotherhood separate the political 
functions of their organizations from the spiritual ones. Older leaders in each group initially 
considered the religious arm as the highest authority; however, as younger members led the 
groups toward the political realm, they began to critique the authoritative structure that had been 
created by the old guard. 
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Leadership 
The origins and decision-making process of a group can reveal much about an SMO 's 
ideology, structure, and other functions. Authoritative figures are being replaced with realistic 
leaders that reflect each group's changing beliefs. The ideological debates between young and 
old members of the four groups reveal the emergence of a new, pragmatic generation of leaders . 
Authoritative Structures 
While non-lslamists were demanding change within the government, the lslamist SMOs 
were busy disputing internal reforms, generational gaps, and beliefs. Between AI Ad! and the 
Brotherhood, 31 quotations collected on the leadership structures focused on polarization among 
leaders. This divide emerged from debates over authority. Founding members of both groups 
privilege religious power over all others, and prefer a more authoritative approach. Younger 
members, on the other hand, argue for more consensus-based approach to decision-making. 
The religious legitimacy of AI Adl's leader, Yassine, allowed him to be successful and 
authoritative in style. Bahaji (2011: 44) describes Yassine ' s role as the religious leader of AI 
Ad!: "the murshid holds supreme rule, followers of the base have no decision making powers .. . 
[The murshid] also has right to make emergency executive decisions without orientation 
counsel." According to Sufi ideology, the murshid is a sacred authority that cannot be questioned 
by members of a lower rank. "The organization[al] nature of AI Ad! Wal Ihsan is based on the 
belief in a 'sacrosanct' status of its leader and his religious attributes."7 To disagree with Yassine 
wou ld be to question the legitimacy of the murshid. Because most AI Ad! members consider 
themselves religious, they are forced to obey the murshid and his rigid decision-making process. 
7 Moroccan daily accuses ls lamists of taking control of reformist movement. (20 II , May 27) .BBC Monitoring 
Midd le East- Political, p. 1. Casablanca. 
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The Brotherhood struggles with internal factions due to the General Guide's power over 
both the political and religious arms of the group. Despite the separation of the two arms, many 
young and moderate Brotherhood leaders have begun to resist the old guard. Stacher (2002) 
unveils one of the potential causes of factionalism: "by concentrating power in the hands of 
approximately ten senior decision-makers, the Brotherhood alienated other prominent and 
politicized members, such as Wasat founder Abu Ala-Madi" (420). The General Guide, the 
highest authority in the group, struggled when younger leaders of the Brotherhood began to 
desire political participation. The General Guide's power within the organization may have 
worked for the original Brotherhood structure, which was exclusively involved in social services. 
Factionalism became rampant once the group formed their political wing. 
Generationa l Gaps 
The Brotherhood's leadership polarization can also be explained by the generational gap 
among members. Three generations of leaders can be identified based on their historical and 
ideological differences: the old guard, pragmatic conservatives, and reformists (Wickham 2011). 
The old guard, or the Da'wa faction, experienced repression under Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
Egypt's first president (Zahid 20 l 0). They are "generally more zealous and conservative, and 
were committed primarily to long-term spiritual work and to preserving the movement's unity" 
(91 ), and are "strongly represented in the Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau and local branch 
offices" (209). Additionally, past experiences made the group "deeply suspicious of other groups 
and unforgiving toward former political rivals such as the Nasserists, Arab nationalists, and 
Marxists" (Elad-Aitman 2006: 26). The old guard is close to Islam not only in ideology, but also 
in its opposition to non-Islamist political parties. Younger generations are more ideologically 
flexible and willing to work with secular parties. 
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Members of the second faction, referred to as 'pragmatic conservatives,' are distinct from 
the old guard because they "combine religious conservatism with a belief in the value of 
participation and engagement. .. [and] are willing to cooperate with secular groups in pursuit of 
common goals" (210). This group emerged in the 1980s and gave the Brotherhood its 
motivation to enter the political realm. The pragmatic conservatives consist mostly of individuals 
with legislative experiences. 
The new generation ofleaders that emerged during the 1990s is the most ideologically 
distant from the old guard. The "reformist" faction "calls for democratic reform of the Egyptian 
state and the democratic reform of the Muslim Brotherhood itself' (21 0). They criticize the 
authority given to the Guidance Bureau and Supreme Guide and promote the inclusion of Coptic 
Christians and women into the Brotherhood's leadership structure. Unlike the former two 
factions, the reformers believe that Islamic authority should not be the final word in the group 's 
decision-making process. 
AI Adl and the Muslim Brotherhood 's original leadership structure considered Islamic 
figures as the highest authorities. As new leaders became politically active, divisions between the 
old and new guards emerged. The young members are leading both groups to adopt a more 
democratic decision-making process. Essam el-Erian, a senior leader of the Brotherhood, 
expresses this emerging view when he asserts, " it's time for solidarity! It 's time for unity ; in my 
opinion we need a national consensus"8. From the youths' perspective, internal divisions can be 
avoided by the inclusion of all group members in the decision-making process. 
s KIRKPATRICK, D. D., & GOODMAN, J.D. (201 1, February 16). Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to Be Political 
Party. The New York Times, p. 2. Cairo/New York. 
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For the non-Islamist group Kefaya, the question who makes the decision reveals more 
about the group's historical and religious roots than the question how are decisions made. 
George Ishaq, a Coptic Christian, and Magdy Hussein were both members of the Islamist 
political party, Hizb al-Amal before forming Kefaya (Shorbagy 2007). Another founding 
member, Abde l Gelil Moustafa, was a former Brotherhood member and founder of the moderate 
Islamist group AI-Was at. 9 The two journalists in the group, Abdel Wahab El Messiry and Abdel 
Halim Qandeel, are experts on the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the latter of which is heavily influenced 
by Gamal Abdel Nasser. 10 Islamist or not, Kefaya's historical connection to the 1970s student 
movements clarifies why the unification of Islamists, leftists, Marxists, and Nasserites is 
possible. 
Membership Demographics 
The socioeconomic backgrounds of each of the four SMOs differ significantly. Twenty-
seven percent of the data I collected on the four groups' membership demographics referred to 
socioeconomic backgrounds when discussing their members. AI Ad! is the only group that 
recruits its members primarily from lower socioeconomic statuses. The other three SMOs have 
gained their support from middle class professionals, intellectuals, and political elites. 
Recruiting the Poor 
AI Ad!, unlike the other three groups, recruits its members from the lower socioeconomic 
strata of society. Daadaoui (2008: 229) points out that AI Ad! " is increasingly gaining followers 
in the shantytowns in Tangiers, Rabat, Marrakech and Casablanca." Instead oftaking advantage 
of middle class professionals in large, industrialized cities, AI Ad! consciously focuses on the 
9 Kefaya coordinator retains seat for another year. (2010, January 14).Daily News Egypt, p. 2. Cairo. 
1
° Kefaya regroups with new Coalition for Change. (2009, January 2l).Daily News Egypt, p. 3. Cairo. 
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poorest members of society. Even its newest members emerge from the "growing number of. .. 
educated young people unable to find work" (Yildirim 20 l 0: 355). AI Ad! is primarily interested 
in recruiting from a lower socioeconomic status. Literally translating to "Justice and Charity," AI 
Ad! gains influence among the poor partly because of its Islam-inspired social services. 
Upper and Midd l e C las s Profe ss ionals 
The Brotherhood, Kefaya, and the F20M recruit among middle and upper class 
intellectuals, professionals, and political elites. According to AI Jazeera, the F20M includes 
"participants across various sectors of society, from trade unions to Berber rights to human rights 
groups." 11 Similarly, the two Egyptian groups have almost exclusively focused on the upper and 
middle classes. Ahmad Hamad, executive director of the pro-democracy Hisham Mubarak Law 
Center, indicates that Kefaya "is mainly suppatted by the political elite. You can't say that it has 
gained any footho ld among the wider masses." 12 Zahid (20 I 0) explains the change in the 
Brotherhood's demographics as it gained suppo1t in syndicates. In both groups, recruiting from 
the middle and upper classes appears to be more appealing than AI Adl's approach. Still, this 
does not suggest that the members of these groups come from a secular segment of society. 
Cross-class alliances within Egyptian communities can help make sense of Kefaya and 
the Brotherhood's membership demographics. Individuals who are from middle and upper-
classes hold a variety of professions and have access to different resources. Clarke (2004) points 
to Islamic medical clinics in Cairo as one way that middle and upper-class professionals have 
been brought together. Regardless of their individual ideological views, Clark notes that "they 
are indeed part of a larger lslamist phenomenon, connected to it via their ties to the boards of 
11 Al-Jazeera reports Moroccan protests following referendum on constitution. (20 II , July 5).BBC Monitoring 
Middle East, p. 3. Rabat. 
12 Wi lson, S., & Wi lliams, D. (2005, April 17). A New Power Rises Across Mideast; Advocates for Democracy 
Begin to Taste Success After Years of Fruitless Eff01i. The Washington Post, p. 6. Beirut. 
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directors. They become part of and have access to the growing horizontal Islamist networks" 
(965). She insists that secular doctors and rich donors can be part of a "larger Islamist 
phenomenon" precisely because they are brought together through Islamic medical clinics. The 
Brotherhood and Kefaya do not gain their support from this specific network, but may have 
access to similar "Islamic networks" where politicians, doctors, lawyers, and engineers are 
brought together through Islamic institutions. 
Means of Communication 
Blogs, social networking websites, online group-sponsored newspapers, and YouTube 
videos have become extremely important tools for communication among the four SMOs. For 
the Brotherhood, the internet gives underrepresented members room to disagree with their 
leaders without risking direct confrontations. lt also provides all groups with a chance to avoid 
state repression. 
The Internet as an Arena for Dissent 
Brotherhood blogging and Facebook usage facilitate "both the debate between 
generations within the Muslim Brotherhood and also the geographic debate between 
Brotherhood bloggers in different regions" (8). Similarly, women "through blogging and other 
internet communication tools .. . found a new avenue to express themselves and have their 
experiences heard" (Darlene 2011 :75). Female members and young members, both ignored by 
the old guard, may now openly voice their opinions and gain power within the Brotherhood by 
utilizing online resources . These members often bring up the ideological difference of the group. 
Ajemian (2008: 6) observes that "blogging has enabled moderate Muslim Brothers, like Abdel 
Monem Mahmoud, to publicly critique policies set forth by the group's more conservative 
leadership." The anonymity provided by online tools preserved the Brotherhood's organization 
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while slowly introducing the group to moderate ideas of Islam. The same anonymity that gives 
younger members a safe place to express liberal ideological views also shelters Brotherhood 
members from state repression. 
The Internet as a Safe Haven 
All four SMOs use the internet as a means of communication to circumvent highly 
repressive regimes. Isherwood (2008) describes the Brotherhood's choice to begin this type of 
communication: "over the course of 2005 and 2006, the state took action in 
universities ... preventing them from standing for student government positions and preventing 
many from graduating. This restriction of political space in universities drove many young 
Muslim Brotherhood members online to blogging" (5). The internet provides a safe haven for 
Brotherhood members to express opinions without being harassed. Whereas lslamists once relied 
on mosques and universities for protection, they now depend on the anonymity of the internet. 
Trends in Organizational and Leadership Structures 
Organizational and leadership structures of the four SMOs are constantly adapting to 
changing environments. Islamist groups traditionally set up hierarchal structures based off of 
religious authority. 13 Those who were considered most knowledgeable in Islam were also the 
ones making the groups' decisions. The leaders were authoritarian in their style and dissent was 
unwelcome. AI Ad! is the strongest representation of this traditionally Islamic structure among 
the four SMOs. 
13 1 use the term 'traditional ' to describe the type of structure that was used by the early Brotherhood, l-lamas, and 
theocratic states, such as Iran, which make up modern Western perceptions oflslamist groups and states. For more 
about Hamas and their Brotherhood origins see: Abu-Amr, Ziad . "A Historical and Political Background." Journal 
ofPalestine Studies 22, no. 4 (1993): 5-19; and Robinson, Glenn E. "l-lamas as Social Movement." In Islamic 
Activism: a Social Movement Theory Approach, by Quintan Wiktorowicz. Bloomington, Indiana: indiana 
University Press, 2004. To see more about the role and power of religious clerics in lran see: Arjomand, S. A. 
( 1989). The turban for the crown: the Islamic revolution in Iran. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
29 
Hatem M. Hassan 
Yet, the data reveals that AI Adl and the Brotherhood's traditional structures quickly 
failed. Changes in their environments caused ideological differences among members. Their first 
attempt at adaptation was the division of their organizations into political and religious arms. 
Polarization within both SMOs became rampant, since the structural split represented a larger 
ideological division between religiously conservative and moderate leaders. Due to its rigid 
structure and authoritative leadership, AI Adl was negatively impacted once Yassine was 
arrested (Bahaj i 2011 ). The Brotherhood, on the other hand, went through a trial-and-error 
process. After a series of splinter groups, including the moderate fslamist AI- Wasat party, the 
Brotherhood changed its structure. Ideological battles through blogs, YouTube videos, and other 
online means of communication introduced the group to its members ' diverse beliefs. The 
Brotherhood began recruiting members from politically active middle and upper-class segments 
of Egypt. The group understood that changes in the traditional structure were necessary if the 
group was to continue its influence over the Egyptian people. 
Kefaya and the F20M were born from the trial-and-error processes of Islamist groups. 
While the media mistakenly view their structure as leaderless and amorphous, the groups 
strategically structure themselves to be ideologically flexible. Leaders are Islamic, liberal, and 
socialist in their historical roots. Similarly, members come from all economic sectors of society, 
and use various technologies to share their beliefs. Coalition-style structures prepare the two 
SMOs for their environmental changes. 
Islam is present in all four groups due to the large populations of devout Muslims in 
Egypt and Morocco. However, the two countries are ideologically diverse and demographically 
heterogeneous. The SMOs that are destined to survive are those that open up their structures to 
include devout Muslims, liberals, socialists, and other politically motivated members of 
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societies. Traditional authoritative structures are incompatible with increasingly diverse SMOs. 
Islamist groups that fail to mimic their environments' pluralism will be riddled with factionalism 
and will have difficulty in mobilizing a large population. 
2. Recruitment and Activities 
The following analysis is based off of the 202 pieces of information I collected on 
recruitment methods and non-protest activities ofthe four groups (see Table 1.3b). 
Non-Protest Activities 
Besides protesting, rallying, and demonstrating, what other activities do the members of 
an SMO engage in? For the four groups, the answer generally falls under two categories. All but 
the F20M engages, or has engaged, in religious activities, such as charity work, sermons, and 
holiday gatherings. Additionally, the Egyptian groups plan private meetings at members' homes. 
Social Services 
Religious outreach and charitable work have heavily influenced the ideologies of both AI 
Ad! and the Brotherhood (Laskier 2003, Hamzawy and Brown 20 I 0). [t is therefore not 
surprising how consistently the two groups dedicate their resources to these activities. AI Ad! is 
noted to "run blood banks, help people organize funerals and, on feast days ... [offer] lamb to the 
needy" (229). They also gathered at mosques to express "their denouncement of government 
corruption, the decay of Muslim society, and the blind emulation of Western societies"(Bahaji 
2011 :47). When referring to the Brotherhood's activities, Pioppi (2011) illustrates how the 
organization "consolidated its social presence through the establishment of an efficient network 
of charities linked to private (ably) mosques" (20 11: 3). When groups are not protesting against 
the regimes, they are heavily involved in social and religious services. 
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Private Gatherings: Preserving the Sacred 
Both Kefaya and the Brotherhood continue to host private gatherings at leaders' homes. 
During their early years, Kefaya members would gather to break their fast during Ramadan-the 
holiest month on the Islamic calendar. Shorbagy (2007:184) describes Kefaya's founding: "over 
iftar (the meal that breaks the fast in Ramadan) at the house of al Wassat leader Abu! El Mady in 
2003, a group of twenty-three people bitterly asked themselves, Where is Egypt going?" 
Considering that the founder was himself a Coptic (George Ishaq), meeting over a religious meal 
demonstrates the necessity of the Islamic ritual in Egyptian society. Additionally, the dinner was 
hosted at the home of a former Brotherhood member and founder of the moderate Islamist AI-
Wasat party. For Kefaya, the iftar gatherings at El Madi's would go on for years after their 
formation. 14 
One explanation for the Brotherhood's private gathering relates to the nationalization of 
mosques in Egypt. During the I 990s, the government attempted tore-nationalize mosques in 
order to monitor the political activities and discussions within them (Pioppi 20 ll ). The Egyptian 
government's threat to the Brotherhood's private network of mosques and charities forced the 
group to revert to the private realm until the 2005 elections. Another explanation is more relevant 
to Egyptian society as a whole. An tar (2006:51) suggests that "there is a new space for religious 
ideas in Egyptian society, encompassing a wide network of individual home gatherings, 
charitable associations and chat rooms, all linked to each other and working on a single 
objective, namely, preaching religion for people who are not familiar with it so as to prepare an 
14 Shadid , A. (2007, March 18). Imagining Otherwise In Egypt; Opposition Campaign Embodying Bush Vision Now 
Lies in Pieces. The Washington Post, p. 5. CALRO. 
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Islamic renaissance." Antar recognizes the private nature of Egyptians religious activity when 
using traditional Islamic institutions is not possible. 
Mobilization and Recruitment Methods 
This section includes data which explicitly connected group activities to membership 
recruitment and mobilization. I have divided recruitment techniques into face-to -face and non-
personal methods. Some face-to-face methods of recruitment used by the groups include 
networking between friends and families, creating group "open houses," and door-to-door 
campaigning. Social-networking websites, cassettes, flyers , posters, magazines, articles, and 
newspapers are examples of non-personal methods. My data reveals that even lslamist groups 
which used to rely on mosque networks have chosen other techniques to mobilize potential 
members. 
Face-to-Face Recruitment 
Recruitment through physical interaction seems to be present in all four SMOs, and it 
was explicitly mentioned 11 times. In 2006, AI Ad! began recruiting its members through "open 
houses" and summer camps, where individuals would meet with leaders to learn the ideology of 
the group (Ottaway & Riley 2006). The F20M chose to recruit its members through affiliated 
NGOs. Roko 's (20 II: 1 00) interview with a member of the movement reveals that the Moroccan 
Association of Human Rights (MAHRI ADMH) was particularly effective at " reaching out to 
new constituencies and generations." Kefaya has asserted that their "street demonstrations were 
the most important means to spread its ideas" 15 • In the 2011 uprisings, "Brotherhood members 
15 Sha 'ban, A. B. al-D. (2006) . The Butterfly Effect: Kefaya-Past and Present. Cairo: Kefaya Printings . 
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knocked on doors in Alexandria to mobilize protesters" 16 . Each group relies on some face-to-face 
interaction, whether for immediate mobilization or gradual recruitment. However, increases in 
government repression in 2005 for Egypt and 2006 for Morocco, and again in 2011 for both 
countries, have caused all four SMOs to look for new methods of recruitment. 
Facebook, Twitter, and the Blogosphere 
Websites, blogs, flyers, cassettes, CDs, and magazines are some of the alternative 
methods of recruiting individuals. Non-personal methods were mentioned 16 times among the 
four SMOs. For Al Adl and the Brotherhood, this suggests a change in their traditional recruiting 
tactics. Laskier (2003: 6) describes how the group was "forbidden to disseminate its ideas in 
mosques, it [instead] relied on an extensive network of organizers, cassettes, the internet, and a 
limited circulation of publications." In Morocco, this sacred venue for political dissent lost its 
immunity and was subjected to government repression. According to Isherwood (2008: 2) "the 
biggest recent change in the Egyptian blogosphere is the entrance, en masse, of the Muslim 
Brotherhood." Since 1999, the Brotherhood has created websites, blogs, electronic journals, and 
YouTube videos in order to introduce potential members to its ideology (5). Kefaya and the 
F20M gained their fame by using online recruitment tools. In fact, Kefaya is known by scholars 
to have introduced the Brotherhood to this mobilization technique (Ajemian 2008). 
Trends in Recruitment and Activities 
Indications within all four groups reveal that SMOs are adapting to increasingly 
repressive regimes while simultaneously trying to hold on to their traditionally Islamic activities 
and methods of recruiting. Government repression caused charity-driven groups to look for 
16 Verma, S. (20 11 , February 1 ). Islamists come late to the party; Muslim Brotherhood's mixed messages about 
largely secular protest movement highlight the religious divide in Egypt. The Globe and Mail (Canada), p. 2. Cairo. 
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alternative ways of operating. Egyptian groups are adapting by holding activities at private 
venues. As the Moroccan and Egyptian governments began targeting mosques, the groups found 
new ways of expressing their political beliefs. 
The use of internet technologies as an alternative way of mobilizing members of society 
reveals a pragmatism in all four groups. As the pioneers of the method, Kefaya and the F20M 
continue to influence a new generation of protestors. AI Adl and the Brotherhood's internet use 
demonstrate their pragmatism. The move away from using charity and mosque networks 
indicates a departure from the historically-lslamic recruiting technique. To the lslamist groups, 
these networks have been both major sources for group activities and pools for potential 
recruitment. By adopting the recruitment methods of Kefaya and the F20M, the lslamists are 
filling in the gap that years of repression have created. 
3. Ideology, Ideas and Beliefs 
For the analysis of the following section, 1 collected 894 pieces of information on the four 
groups' ideologies, ideas, and beliefs (see table 1.3c). 
Explicit Ideology 
The way in which a group connects its ideas to the beliefs of potential members can 
determine its success at mobilizing individuals. I specifically focused on whether the four groups 
had incorporated Islam into their ideology. Looking at a group's rhetoric reveals how it tries to 
connect its ideology to the beliefs of potential and existing members. As the individuals within a 
community changes, the way in which a group communicates changes as well. 
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Democracy and Liberalism 
Liberal beliefs were the most common theme among the four groups' ideologies. Thirty-
four percent of the information I collected on the groups' ideologies made at least some reference 
to democratic values. Kefaya ' s coordinator Abdel Halim Qandeel asserted that members "must 
seek real change rather than [simple] reform of the existing regime." 17 One scholar refers to the 
group as a movement that "sought to serve all Egyptians" (Oweidat et al. 2008: 11 ). Kefaya is an 
all-inclusive and pro-democratic group. The SMO's leaders use words like justice, equality, and 
freedom to project their image of democracy. 
The Brotherhood merged their democratic and Islamic beliefs into one coherent ideology. 
To the Brotherhood, "the sharia is not in contradiction to democracy, but shares its most 
important features such as the separation of powers, party pluralism, [and] peaceful rotation of 
power" (Antar 2006: 19). The Brotherhood not only supports democracy, but attempts to tie the 
concept to its original idea of Islamic law, or sharia. It also points out "the deplorable state of 
human rights and freedom in the Muslim world," and extends human rights, "letting women 
participate in da'wa and in political activities" (19). Younger Brotherhood members recently 
announced that they considered "Coptic Christians to be full citizens, not dhimma with 
diminished rights" (Zuhur 2007: 71). The Brotherhood aims to disprove popular beliefs by being 
specific about their ideas of plurality. Their ideology proves to be anything but rigid. 
Sharia and the Islamic State 
Sharia (Islamic law) and the creation of an Islamic state were mentioned 27 separate 
times between AI Adl and the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood asserts that sharia is "the most 
efficient way out of all internal and external problems, political, economical (sic) , social and 
17 Kefaya regroups with new Coalition for Change. (2009, January 2l).Daily News Egypt, p. 3. Cairo. 
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cultural, and will happen through the formation of the Muslim individual , the Muslim family, the 
Muslim government, [and] the Islamic state" (Antar 2006: 18). They connect their beliefs of an 
Islamic state to the everyday problems of Egyptians. However, AI Ad I and the Brotherhood 
understand the gradual process involved in making a community more Islamic. One member of 
AI Ad l points out that they "do not have the pretension to change the world; all we want is to be 
left in peace to be able to educate and purify Moroccan society from within ... we are turuqis 
[brotherhood of followers], not Khomeinists" (Yildirim 2010: 297). AI Ad I and the Brotherhood 
offer pragmatic steps towards a more Islamic way of life. 
Kefaya and Xenophobic Origins 
The American invasion of Iraq revitalized genera l dislike for Western imperialism in the 
Muslim world and is, in fact, patt of Kefaya's raison d'etre (Browers 2007). In September 2004 
the group expressed their beliefs in their first official charter: 
The grave dangers and challenges flanking our nation, represented in the American 
invasion and occupation of Iraq, the continuous Zionist aggression against the 
Palestinian people, and the projects of redrawing the map of our Arab nation ... threaten 
. , . d . ., 'd . 18 our natwna zsm an zmpen s our z .entzty. 
The group went as far as to launch "a million-signature campaign to pressure the regime into 
withdrawing from the Camp David accord" (Sahgal 2008: 103). Given the political milieu at the 
time, Kefaya emerged with xenophobic sentiments. However, the group emphasizes nationalism, 
not Islam, as the root of their beliefs. 
18 Kefaya founding statement, W\'1/w.harakamasria.org/nodc/803 (accessed October 11 , 2006). 
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Overall, the four SMOs communicate their ideologies to their members and the larger 
public by using a combination of liberal democratic and Islamic values. Such values include 
democracy, equality, and freedom from corruption and social injustice. In most cases, these are 
mentioned by the ls lamist groups. My data suggests that Islamist groups are even more careful 
than non-Islamists when connecting Islam to their constituents' beliefs. The best example of this 
was when the Muslim Brotherhood created 'the Freedom and Justice Party' in 2011 . Interested in 
gaining support for the upcoming parliamentary elections, the group was quite direct about their 
support for democracy and opposition towards religious authoritarianism. However, the 
Brotherhood and AI Adlnever comprise or omit their Islamic beliefs from their rhetoric, but 
rather integrate them with liberal values. Like all other parts of an SMO, the language used to 
express ideology must adapt to the changing beliefs of members and the larger community. 
Organizational Goals and Demands 
An organization's goals and demands connect its ideology to its political and social 
objectives. If a group becomes popular, these objectives can become realities within the 
community they exist in. For many Middle Eastern communities, support of a group is dependent 
on whether these demands and goals are related to Islamic doctrine and beliefs. In my data, 
secular demands were the most popular theme (33 quotations) among the four groups. The next 
most common was religious reform (29 quotations). 
Secular Demands 
Twenty-five percent of the data I collected on the four groups' goals and demands made 
references to economic reforms. Along with a general end to corruption and despotism, F20M 
activists call for "better basic social services for Moroccans including education, healthcare, jobs 
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and housing." 19 Similarly, the Brotherhood is concerned with "development issues .. . [such as] 
agriculture, industry, urbanization, education, scientific research, health and environment" (Antar 
2006: 19). A statement by a Brotherhood policy maker provides one reason for their focus on 
economic demands: "we can't talk about implementing Islamic (sharia) law when the country is 
experiencing such devastating economic problems."20 As SMOs become more involved in 
solving immediate political issues of a country, they tend to incorporate their explicit ideology 
less than a group focused on social services would. In other words, there is a trade-off between 
the beliefs of a politically involved group, and the policies they can actually implement. The 
focus on economic demands also demonstrates the Brotherhood's pragmatism. In Egypt and 
Morocco, unemployment, unfair wages, and extreme corruption are causing groups to address 
the more relevant problems of their societies. 
Religious Demands: An Older Brotherhood 
The Brotherhood that focuses on economic issues is one that emerged during the 2011 
protests. In the early 2000s, however, the group frequently mentioned religious reform. It 
proposed laws that would "forbid alcohol in Egypt and ban art that makes obvious references to 
sexuality," and demanded "the resignation ofthe Grand Shaykh ofai-Azhar in 2003" (Hamzawy 
and Brown 201: 25). While some of these demands resembled an older, less tolerant 
Brotherhood, others promoted equality. During the same period, the group suggested "the ri ght 
of veiled women to be hired for government-funded television channels" (24). The Brotherhood 
began to adapt their Islamic demands to a more liberal society where women could enter the 
19 Laghrous, M., & Ellouzi, N. (20 11, October 4). Young Moroccan protesters vow to continue action agai nst 
corruption. BBC Monitoring Middle East, p. 2. Casablanca. 
20 Power dream now reality for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. (20 12, January 23). The New Zealand Herald, p. 3. 
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workforce. Like its ideology, the Brotherhood's demands addressed both the Islamic beliefs of 
their devout members and the liberal beliefs of a larger Egyptian society. 
AI Adl, the F20M, and Kefaya have rooted Islam out of their demands and goals, whether 
doing it consciously to adhere to an increasingly diverse population, or unconsciously as a 
product of secularization. The only group that mentioned religious reforms frequently-the 
Muslim Brotherhood-has significantly shifted towards more pressing social issues in recent 
years. Instead, all four SMOs talk about the economic demands that both Egypt and Morocco 
desperately seem to need. lslamist or not, they agree on a few fundamental demands: economic 
reform, social justice, and an end to corruption. 
Symbols and Slogans 
Symbo l s 
Demonstrators often combine diverse religious, cultural, and political symbols into one 
protesting arena. Protesting near mosques, praying at demonstrations, and holding Qur'ans 
demonstrate how groups connect ideas of Islam to the beliefs of a larger society. Moroccan 
demonstrations during the early months of 2011 were described using the following imagery: 
The black flags of "Al-Qa 'idah " have been fluttering alongside the flags of the 
communists, pictures of Ernesto Che Guevara, and the Amazigh [Berber] flags 
above the heads of the participants in the 20 February demonstrations. 21 
Protestors, ls lamist or non-Islamist, use multiple cultural, political, and religious symbols. 
Together the symbols represent the ideological diversity of the SMOs themselves. 
2 1 Mokraa, L. (20 II, September 27). Moroccan Salafi group uses reform protest umbrella for own demands. BBC 
Monitoring Middle East, p. 3. London. 
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Yet, religious symbolism was absent in recent Egyptian protests. New York Times 
reporter Scott Atran insists that "only a small minority of the protesters in Tahrir Square joined 
its members in prayers there (estimates range from 5 percent to 10 percent), and few Islamic 
slogans or chants were heard."22 Islam has been less influential in recent protests. However, my 
study focuses on the SMOs themselves and not on isolated protest events. 
Slogans 
While all four SMOs' slogans project ideas of freedom, democracy, and government 
transparency (see Table 1.4), the Brotherhood has only recently moved towards this direction. 
The group went from chanting "Islam is the solution" to demanding "a civil state with an Islamic 
frame of reference." They choose their slogans carefully and only loosely tie Islam to societal 
problems. Their political motto, "participation, not domination" also reveals their acceptance of a 
pluralistic political society (Hamzawy and Brown 2010: 2). For the Brotherhood, Egyptian 
politics should be run through an Islamic lens. However, the group has never entirely taken Islam 
out of their rhetoric. Even with the presence of Kefaya, the Brotherhood continues to voice their 
desire for a more Islamic society. 
This does not mean that the Brotherhood wishes to create an Islamic state. ln fact, the 
group introduced the "Islam is the solution" slogan when it entered the political realm withAl-
Ahrar and Al- 'Amal-two Islamist groups- during the 1987 elections (Antar 2006:20). The 
group has only been gaining political power since then. The Brotherhood would have utilized 
their newly acquired political power towards implementing sharia had they truly desired an 
Islamic theocracy. Instead, they moved towards a moderate vision oflslam. 
22 Atran, S. (20 ll, February 3). Egypt's Bumbling Brotherhood. The New York Times, p. 3 
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Trends in Ideas, Beliefs, and Ideologies 
For non-Islamists and Islamists alike, democratic and liberal values seem to be of 
increasing importance. Non-Islamist groups were born as pro-democratic movements, while 
Islamists were able to fuse their Islamic beliefs with liberal ones. 
When anti-Western and anti-Israeli stances do come up, they seem to be triggered by 
nationalist rather than Islamist sentiments. Since the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, 
Islam and pan-Arabism have been intimately connected (Shupe et al. 1980). U.S. and British 
occupation provoked a general antipathy from left wing liberals, socialists, and conservative 
Islamists. In 2002, pan-Arabism reemerged in the Middle East in suppoti of Palestine's second 
intifada. Characterizing the xenophobic beliefs ofKefaya as solely Islamic or nationalist would 
oversimplify the complex relationship that the two phenomena have had for over half of a 
century. 
More importantly, the decaying quality of life for both Moroccans and Egyptians 
influences the demands of all four SMOs. Some of these demands include an end to corruption, 
religious and gender equality, and basic human rights. Islamist groups never disconnect their 
Islamic beliefs with their political cause, enmeshing the two into one coherent plan. 
Similarly, the slogans and symbols used in protests reflected the ideological and cultural 
diversity of the groups. Despite the lack of its presence in recent Egyptian protests, Islamic 
symbols have played a significant role during past demonstrations in both Morocco and Egypt. 
Slogans used by the Brotherhood during these demonstrations reveal their increasingly moderate 
view ofislam. Overall, the four SMOs' beliefs reflect their understanding of a changing society. 
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4. Relationships with Other Groups 
For the final section, I collected 638 pieces of information on the four groups' relationships 
with other SMOs, political parties, and institutions (see Table 1.3d). 
Relationships with SMOs 
Recruiting members and gaining political influence motivates SMOs to create alliances 
and rivalries among other groups. During February 2011, both AI Ad I and the F20M participated 
in and supported each other at protest events. Kefaya and the Muslim Brotherhood have also 
demonstrated their willingness to cooperate since 2005. Yet, relationships between Islamist and 
non-Islamist SMOs in both countries are often marked by indecisiveness. In part, this is due to 
their mutual fears of ideological compromise. 
Al Adl and the F20M 
AI Adl and the F20M's early relationship was mutually supportive. The Islamist group 
joined the coalition in the initial stages of the 2011 protests "in the belief that its demand for an 
end to repression and corruption represents a popular demand."23 The vague goals--of ending 
the regime's unjust practices-initially caused the two ideo logically different groups to join 
forces. On one occasion, AI Ad! commemorated "New Hegira Day [Islamic New Year] by 
distributing balloons to children, and milk, dates and sweets to participants in the march ... the 
group chose to install a loudspeaker. .. and called for the release of the [dissident] rapper Mouadh 
El Haked."24 The Islamist group supported the F20M through its rhetoric and provided it with 
resources for demonstrations. A prominent F20M activist, Abdallah Amin, adds that "the 
23 Moroccan lslamist group ends participation in protest movement. (2011, December 20) .BBC Monitoring Middle 
East, p. 1. Doha. 
24 Radhif, I. (20 11, November 29). Moroccan protest movement reportedly questions fairness of25 Nov poll. BBC 
Monitoring Middle East, p. 2. Casablanca. 
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Islamists were useful to the February 20 Movement, because their cadres were well disciplined, 
and they could provide a sizable pool of rank-and-file in order to throng the streets and add 
significance to the contention" (Roko 20 II: I 06). Sharing the same willingness to cooperate, the 
F20M mentioned AI Adl ' s membership pool as the primary incentive for including the group in 
its coalition. As long as their goals remained vague enough, the groups would be able to continue 
their positive relationship. 
As the Moroccan government implemented constitutional reforms, AI Adl and the F20M 
began disputing their specific demands. AI Adl's spokesman Hassan Bennajeh gives his account 
of the disagreement, stating "at the beginning of the demonstrations, we agreed with the demands 
for the end to despotism and corruption ... With time, we found many elements want to impose 
the parliamentary monarchy as a limit. We do not agree."25 Because AI Adl refuses to recognize 
the king as a figure head, they clashed with F20M activists who once shouted "we love our 
country, we love our king, but we are against corruption and economic and political 
monopoly."26 Conflicts over specific demands began to polarize the two groups ideologically. 
Almost a year after their mutual protests, AI Ad! left the F20M, "because it [had] already 
achieved all it could possibly do," claiming that they were now "looking for broader means to 
make [their] demands heard." 27 Despite access to each other's members and their mutual dislike 
for corruption and despotism, AI Adl and F20M were unable to overcome their ideological 
differences. 
25 Schemm, P. (2011 , December 19). Morocco's Islamist movement leaves reform group. Associated Press, p. 2. 
Rabat. 
26 Alaoui, H. (201 I, February 20). Thousands march in Morocco to seek reform. Associated Press Online, p. 2. 
Rabat. 
27 Moroccan Islamist group ends participation in protest movement. (20 II , December 20).BBC Monitoring Middle 
East, p. l. Doha. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood and Kejaya 
Unlike the Moroccan groups, Kefaya and the Muslim Brotherhood have sustained a 
relationship since 2005, beginning with their cooperation at the pro-Gaza demonstrations. During 
2009, a European aid convoy destined for Palestinians in Gaza arrived on Egyptian soi l. The 
Daily News Egypt reported that "the Kefaya movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, [and] the 
unofficial Al-Karama party, are planning a public reception at all of[the] convoy's stops." 28 In 
an interview with the head of the Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc, Saad El-Katatny stressed 
that the "currents have never seen eye to eye as much as they do regarding the lifting of the 
blockade from Gaza and supporting the Palestinian people. "29 The Palestinian conflict was often 
a rallying point for the two groups, allowing them to share beliefs and organizational demands 
during protests.30 
When Palestine was not the issue, the Egyptian SMOs were more careful to accept each 
other's ideologies. Kefaya always had a willingness to work with the Islamist group "provided 
the Brotherhood behaves like a political and not a religious organization" (Sahgal 2008: 1 02). 
They supported an alliance with the Brotherhood as long as they maintained their ideological 
flexibility. Similarly, the Brotherhood spokesperson, Ali Abdel Fattah, said that the group wants 
alliances "with whoever will be willing to hold our hands."31 Another member told the 
Washington Post that the "Brotherhood wants what Kifaya and others want: free and fair 
28 Opposition forces to we lcome European aid convoy. (2009, March 2).Daily News Egypt, p. l. CAIRO. 
29 1bid. 
30 Shadid, A. (2007, March 18). Imagining Otherwise In Egypt; Opposition Campaign Embodying Bush Vision Now 
Lies in Pieces. The Washington Post, p. 5. CAIRO; and Oweidat, N., Benard, C., Stahl, D., Kildani, W., O'Connell , 
E., & K. Grant, A. (2008). The Kefaya Movement. A Case Study of a Grassroots Reform Initiative (p. 81 ). Santa 
Monica,CA: the RAND National Defense Research Institute. 
31 Hie!, B. (2005, June 19). Egyptian reformers taking it to streets. Pittsburgh Tribune Review, p. 4. Cairo. 
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elections."32 Like the Moroccan groups, Kefaya and the Brotherhood's supported each other's 
broad demands. Ideological differences led to separate demands, and eventually caused the two 
groups to distance themselves from each other. 
The negative relationship between Kefaya and the Brotherhood began with their political 
demands against the Mubarak Regime. One blogger described the dispute as: 
more on the issue of hereditary rule than [a} religious issue. While Kifaya had 
expressed complete opposition to Mubarak and his son Gamal, Muslim 
Brotherhood members had claimed that as long as emergency rule was lifted they 
would accept either of the two as the president (Sahgal, 2008: 162). 
Kefaya's original demand of an end to the Mubarak regime was non-negotiable, and became a 
point of division between the two groups. Brotherhood members "focused their critique of 
Kefaya on its 'vulgar' slogans, perceived as 'insulting' the president of the republic"(Shorbagy 
2007: 189). Kefaya retaliated, stating "the Brotherhood is like an enormous body with a very 
small brain. ft takes time to get it moving ... They don't want to miss out."33 Tactics of 
intimidation, initiated by differences in demands, began to split the groups. 
Even during 2011, the Brotherhood continued its ambivalence towards other groups. One 
report describes the Brotherhood indecisiveness by describing their "flurry of mixed 
messages ... they refused to collectively back the protesters ... they condoned individual members 
to march. Two days later, the Brotherhood cal led out al l of its membership onto the streets. Now 
32 Shadid, A. (2005, July 21). Anatomy of a Protest: In Cairo, One Camp Is Soon Two; Religious, Secular Groups 
Vow Unity, But on the Street, Differences Emerge. The Washington Post, p. 4. Cairo. 
33 Verma, S. (20 11 , February 1 ). Is lamists come late to the party; Muslim Brotherhood's mixed messages about a 
largely secular protest movement highlight the religious divide in Egypt. The Globe and Mail (Canada), p. 2. Cairo. 
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they want an official role in any new government." 34 The ambiguity between Islamists and non-
Islamist is, in part, due to the specificity of their demands and exposure to different ideologies. 
But conflicts between groups also emerge as a result of the symbolic tactics of the regime. 
Relationship with Islamic Institutions and the State 
The Moroccan and Egyptian regimes have used Islam to delegitimize AI Adl and the 
Brotherhood, respectively. Government officials use their rhetoric and affiliations with Islamic 
clerics and institutions to claim moral superiority over Islamist SMOs. I recorded 54 accounts of 
the symbolic battle between the state and Islamist groups. In Morocco, AI Ad! is largely 
delegitimized by the regime's claim over religious authority. In Egypt, however, the Brotherhood 
seems to be doing the reverse. The battle between SMOs and the government are determined by 
how each side frame's Islam and the connections that religious figures have to the government. 
Al Ad! versus the Moroccan State 
According to Moroccan law, the king is recognized as Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of 
the Faithful), giving him ultimate religious authority. Yildirim (201 0) suggests that the title ' s 
"perceived control of the religious space in the country dominates the religious discourse in 
Morocco" (295). The religious sacredness of the Moroccan state has caused the general public to 
denounce alternative political solutions proposed by Islamist groups. 
The Moroccan government has also fostered relationships with religious elite, which are 
"characterized by ... [their] utter submission to the interests of the state" (Daadaoui 2008: 217). 
Religious authorities are hired by the state, and occupy positions, such as " religious c ity 
councils, grand Muftis and [become patt ofthe] religious establishment of the ' ulama" (216) . 
34 Ibid. 
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Holding official positions in the Moroccan government, religious authorities provide the state 
with a level of symbolic and religious significance. When Islamist SMOs challenge the state's 
legitimacy, they are attacked on religious grounds. 
The connections formed between the state and religious authority became useful when 
Yassine, AI Adl's leader, began mobilizing against the king. As a response, "the state Ministry 
for Religious Affairs made the official league of 'Ulama' denounce [him]" (231). The state's 
arrest of AI Adl's leader and religious guide, Yassine, caused the group to lose political and 
religious legitimacy. AI Ad insists that the "one of the biggest impediments to their social 
mobilization and overall societal appeal is deeply held ... belief [of the] regime's traditional 
legitimacy and its attendant rituals of power" (Daadaoui 2008: 224). The state's use oflslam 
makes it difficult for any anti-regime Islamist group to succeed. 
The Revered Brotherhood and the Mubarak Regime 
The Brotherhood's religious battle against the state often benefits the group. For example, 
after the Brotherhood's condemnation of Egypt's involvement in the 1991 Iraq war, the regime 
responded by calling Egypt an Islamic rather than secular state (Zahid 2011: 116). In other cases, 
the Brotherhood ' s legitimacy and power relies on its sheer size. For example, the group gained 
legitimacy after taking over government social services during the 1992 Earthquake. 35 This was 
one ofthe reasons for its 2005 electoral success (Pioppi 2011). The Egyptian government 
realized that it would be difficult to take religious authority away from the Brotherhood. Instead, 
they rely "on religious justifications, oppress secular or liberal opponents, and nourish 
obscurantist religious trends within Al-Azhar" (Antar 2006:12). Conscious ofthe religious and 
35 Shadid, A. (2005, July 21). Anatomy of a Protest: In Cairo, One Camp Is Soon Two; Religious, Secular Groups 
Yow Unity, But on the Street, Differences Emerge. The Washington Post, p. 4. Cairo. 
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political influence of the Brotherhood, the Mubarak Regime was careful to use Islamic frames 
against the group. 
In fact, the Brotherhood is often the one delegitimizing the government's actions through 
a religious framework. In 2002, the organization accused the Mubarak regime of undermining AI 
Azhar, one of the oldest religiously-affiliated academic institutions in the world. They claimed 
that such actions would "de-emphasize religion and [the] Arabic language in the school 
curricu lum" (Hamzawy and Brown 2010: 25). Later in 2006, the Brotherhood attacked the 
Ministry of Culture after its criticism the Islamic hijab (veil). They insisted that such attacks 
were "not simply against the Brotherhood or Islamists, but against the entire Islamic nation" 
(Oweidat et al. 2008: 33). By framing the incident as an attack towards Islam as a whole rather 
than against a specific religious institution, the Brotherhood gained support of the wider 
Egyptian Muslim population. A similar framework was used when the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs tried to ban demonstrations within mosques in 2008. The group accused the state of 
trying to "reduce spaces available for free expression under the pretext of protecting places of 
worship" (Hamzawy and Brown 20 I 0: 21 ). Unlike AI Ad!, the Brotherhood was attacking the 
government for threatening Islam 's dai ly practices and rituals. 
Relationship with Political Parties 
All four SMOs distance themselves from Islamist political parties. For the Brotherhood, 
Kefaya is simply too young and has not experienced the hardships of being an Islamist SMO. 
Even AI Ad! and the Brotherhood distance themselves from other Islamists on ideological 
grounds. 
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Kefaya's entrance into the Egyptian political realm after the Brotherhood's 2005 electoral 
success stirred fear among older political parties. Accord ing to one analysis, "older, more-
established parties also did not want Kefaya to take credit for a success they wished to claim as 
the fruit of their long struggle" (Oweidat et al. 2008: 38). In the Brotherhood's opinion, the 
group had not earned their political legitimacy through years of government repression. 
Likewise, the F20M faces similar opposition from older political parties. Many of the younger 
members of well-established political groups, such as the Islamist Justice and Development 
party, "joined in without official blessings [from their] parent organizations."36 Political parties 
were more concerned with young groups not paying 'the dues' that older parties had. 
AI Adl and the Brotherhood's distance from Islamist groups is due to ideological 
differences. AI-Wasat, the Brotherhood's political splinter group, emerged precisely because its 
moderate views of Islam (Stacher 2002). Similarly, AI Adl opposes the Islamist Justice and 
Development party's political alliance with the state and rebukes it acceptance of the regime as a 
legitimate representative of Islam (Yildirim 20 I 0). Debates between political participation and 
the role of Islam divide these groups and make AI Ad I and the Brotherhood generally hostile 
against other Islamist groups. 
Trends in Relationships with Other Groups 
The relationship between SMOs and other groups are always in flux. AI Ad! had some 
success in mobilization when it cooperated with the F20M. Still, the group has been 
systematically delegitimized by the Moroccan government, ignored by the Islamist Justice and 
Development Party, and attacked by pro-democracy movements. The Brotherhood, in contrast, 
36 The New Moroccan Constitution: Real Change or More of the Same? (2011, June 20).States News Service, p. 4. 
Washington, D.C. 
50 
Hatem M. Hassan 
has enjoyed religious legitimacy over government institutions. Despite their influence, the group 
risks compromising its beliefs in order to meet the ideological flexibility of Kefaya. The result is 
a flurry of political splinter groups beginning with AI-Wasat. 
Non-lslamists also share an ever-changing relationship with Muslim groups. Kefaya and 
the F20M are able to build coalitions across extremely diverse political and religious ideologies. 
Nevertheless, as demands become specific, they tend to part with most lslamists. At times, the 
groups belittle their Muslim counterparts for being overly conservative. In other instances, they 
try to tap into lslamists ' large network of support. 
The SMOs are consciously responding to Islamic groups and institutions in order to gain 
political power. Whether SMOs agree on the specific demands or not, their desire for social 
change has kept this dynamic going. 
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Conclusion 
In presenting my results, I have attempted to demonstrate how the relationship between 
Islam and SMOs has largely been underexplored. Speaking about Islam in social movement 
theory involves more than a simple analysis of doctrine. Various interpretations of the religion 
by liberals, moderates, and conservatives restrict SMO leaders from using it as a tool. Islam is 
part of both Egyptian and Moroccan culture. As members are recruited into Islamist and non-
Islamist SMOs, the groups themselves are the ones that must adapt to their environments. 
At times, the changes are part of a conscious effort of group leaders to adjust to a diverse 
population. The Brotherhood has gone from saying "Islam is the solution" to suggesting an 
Islamic frame of reference. The change in rhetoric demonstrates their ability to adapt. 
Groups can also unconsciously adjust to their society since they are themselves members 
of it. The origins of Kefaya and the February 20th Movement, as coalitions of ideologically 
diverse political parties and groups, were mainly a byproduct of ideologically and historically 
diverse members. Kefaya's leaders have historical roots in Nasser pan-Arabism and Islamic 
student movements. The F20M has similar roots in Islamic activism, but also incorporates the 
Moroccan Berber movement. Group leaders must actively respond in order to communicate 
external changes to their existing members. 
Each group ' s ideology reveals elements of Islamic and liberal democratic views. There 
ex ists, therefore, a dynamism within each group's set of beliefs. On the one hand, the Arab-
Israeli conflict has affected the SMOs' negative views of Israel and the West. We see this not 
on ly in AI Ad l and the Brotherhood's explicitly ideologies, but in Kefaya's demands and goals as 
well. Still , each group was able to simultaneously project its ideas of democracy, freedom, 
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equality, and human rights. During the 2011 protests, the two Islamist groups were able to 
cooperate with the non-Islamist SMOs on precisely these terms. By supporting vague liberal 
ideas, AI Adl and the Brotherhood were able to cooperate with the F20M and Kefaya while 
holding on to their more traditional Islamic views. The groups actively shaped their beliefs in 
order to adjust to their surroundings. 
If one was only to look at the four SMOs' ideologies, however, one could say that Islam 
is just a tool to be used when convenient for recruitment and mobilization. On the contrary, AI 
Adl and the Brotherhood's division of their organizational structures into religious and non-
religious arms led to leadership polarization and splinter groups. The F20M and Kefaya, in 
contrast, emerged with decentralized organizational structures that allowed both devout Muslims 
and liberals to join. The groups ' flexibility provided ideological and structural room for Islam 
without dividing the groups into factions. 
Recruitment and non-protest activities are two areas where groups do consciously 
incorporate Islam. Severe repression has made groups reluctant to express their religious beliefs. 
Yet, Islam has not been rooted out ofthe daily lives of Moroccans and Egyptians. Instead, rituals 
and practices are performed in the private realm. Whereas Mosques were once fertile grounds for 
political dissent, groups are now voicing their ideas at members ' homes or through the internet. 
These alternative methods of expression allow both Islamists and non-Islamists to openly express 
their dissent. 
Despite the tactics of repressive regimes, Islam is still largely present in the political 
realm. Constant interaction between AI Adl and the F20M in Morocco, and Kefaya and the 
Brotherhood in Egypt, has resulted in both cooperation and clashes. Ideological differences 
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between generations have caused a proliferation of moderate Islamist political parties. The states, 
too, have instigated symbolic battles with opposition groups. In Morocco, the regime claims to 
hold ultimate religious authority and criticized emerging Islamist groups. In Egypt, the regime 
tacitly submits to the religious legitimacy of AI Azhar and the Brotherhood. For both regimes, it 
is impossible to take Islam out of politics. For the SMOs, interaction with Islamists is 
unavoidable. Those who choose to participate in the political realm often get access to new 
organizational resources. 
The intention of my study was not to connect a SMO's success to Islam. Evident in my 
results, Islam both benefits and restricts groups from being able to function. Instead, I hope to 
have demonstrated religion's continuing role within SMOs. Daily rituals, practices, and beliefs 
of devout Muslims carry over into these groups in different ways. By separating the functions of 
an SMO, I have provided the way in which Islam connects to the Moroccan and Egyptian 
groups. Further research on other lslamist SMOs in the Midd le East will strengthen the 
connection between soc ial movement theory and religion. Scholars must not look to modernity 
or explicit ideologies as the only forms of mobilization in the Midd le East and Muslim world . 
They must, instead, focus on the interrelatedness ofthe structural and micro-sociological factors 
present in the Arab Spring. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.1 - SMOs in the Study 
Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) 
Group Name Ideology 
The February 20th Movement (F20M) 
AI-Adl wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity group) 
Kefaya (Egyptian Movement for Change) 
The Muslim Brotherhood (el-ekhwan al-
muslimun) 
Non-
Islamist 
Islamist 
Non-
Islamist 
Islamist 
Country 
Morocco 
Egypt 
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Table 1.2 - Coding Protocol 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP 
I. Organizational structure 
-What kind of organizational hierarchy, if any, existed within the group (branches, cells, councils, etc.)? Did 
they have a separate political wing? 
2. Leadership 
-How are the decisions made by the leaders within group? What are the demographics of the leaders? 
3. Member demographics/ Profile 
-What were the demographics of members within the group (age, occupation, income, religion, etc.)? 
4. Means of communication 
- What were the means of communication within the group (flyers, twitter, sermons, etc.)? 
RECRUITMENT AND ACTIVITIES 
1. Non protest, group activities 
-What daily activities or events (Quran readings, Friday sermons, etc.) did each group engage in outside of 
protesting? Where did the group have these act ivit ies or meetings? 
2. Recruitment methods 
-How did the organizations recruit its members? 
IDEOLOGIES, IDEAS, AND BELIEFS 
1. Explicit Ideology 
-What are the explicit ideologies of the group? And were there moments where the group's ideology changed? 
2. Narratives and stories 
-What stories, myths, or other narratives did the gro up frequently mention? 
3. Organizational Goals/demands 
-What were the group ' s explicit goals and demands? 
4. Protest Slogans 
- What slogans were used by the group's members during protests, rallies, and demonstrations? 
RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Membership Trend 
-When did the group ' s membership peak and what was the membership size right up to the most recent 
protests? 
2. Relationship to other SMOs 
-What alliances did groups build with each other (worker-student, cleric-worker, etc.)? 
3. Relationship with Islamic groups/ institution 
-What relationships and affiliations did the group, and their leaders, have with religious figures, mosques, and 
other community organizers? 
4. Relationship with political groups 
-Did the group have any connections to legal political parties? 
MISCELLANEOUS 
1. External Events 
-Were there any significant international or regional events that dramatically altered discourse or use ofls lam 
in daily life (terrorist attacks, foreign occupancy, and massive crackdowns)? 
2. Founding date 
3. Different spellings of group name 
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Table 1.3- Results 
(a) Organizational and Leadership Structures 
Code Name 
Organizational Structure 
Leadership 
Membership demographics 
Means of Communication 
Total 
(b) Recruitment and Non-Protest Activities 
Code Name 
Non-Protest group activities 
Mobilization Methods 
Total 
Code Name 
Explicit Ideology 
Organizational Goals/Demands 
Symbols and Rituals at Protests 
Narratives 
Protest Slogans 
Total 
(c) Ideologies, Ideas, and Beliefs 
(d) Relationships with Other Groups 
Code Name 
Relationship to Other SMOs 
Relationships with Islamic Groups/Institutions 
Relationships with Political Groups 
Membership Trends 
Total 
Quotations 
92 20% 
136 30% 
158 34% 
75 16% 
461 100% 
Quotations 
148 73% 
54 27% 
202 100% 
Quotations 
266 30% 
217 24% 
189 21% 
127 14% 
95 II% 
894 100% 
Quotations 
257 40% 
213 33% 
146 23% 
22 3% 
638 100% 
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Table 1.4 -Selected Slogans and Quotes from SMO Members 
MB Kefaya AIAdl F20M 
For Dignity and we love our country, we 
No to inheritance, no to Freedom! No love our king, but we are 
Islam is the Solution 
extension. No Mubarak! constitution without against corruption and 
freedom . economic and political 
monopoly 
In the police station, People in the US. We the sons of the 
poor people who are kifaya to dictators, kifaya 
and Europe always prisoners who are victims 
innocent get tortured to corruptions, and kifaya 
say Morocco is .free. of the anti-terrorism law 
and mistreated while to the silence of Arabs But !f you look here, it call for the release of our 
the thieves aren't eager for change isn't true. fathers prosecuted 
What kind ojjustice is This era is an era of 
Those who did Enough Unemployment, this? Is it because the bribery; bribery rules 
injustice are not Enough Poverty, Enough Americans give them everything; enough 
brought to justice of the Dictatorship 
money? bribery, our pockets are empty. 
It is unjust that the 
A civil state with an Shame, shame, shame! country's riches Peaceful, peaceful until Islamicji-ame of For the imprisonment of should be 
reference the honorable andji-ee, monopolized by a the realization of ji-eedom 
minority 
Freedom, .freedom! One movement, one hand, Listen to the voice of The people want change, 
Where, where? one issue -- ji-eedom! the people not just patching up 
Together for reform. We are not slaves or No to terrorism, a 0 brave Moroccan, Free University. Free property. God created us king who reigns but 
Homeland. ji-ee people," does not ROvern boycotting is the solution 
Participation, not The Americans have sold No to corruption, End the people want the 
domination us out. social injustice martyr's killers 
Table 1.5- Affiliated Coalition Groups 
February 20th Movement Coalition Members Kefaya Coalition Members 
AI Ad! Wal Jhsane (Justice and Charity) Al-Karama Party (the Nasserites) 
The Revo lutionary Socialist Organization (Marxist-
Socialists) the far- left small party the Democratic Path 
the Moroccan Assoc iation for Human Rights Al-ghad Party (Liberals) 
the United Socialist Party(PSU) Al-Wasat Party (ls lamist- MB spli nter group) 
the Sociali st Union of Popular Forces (usfp) H izb Al-Amal (ls lamist Labor Party) 
lstiq lal Party 
The Amazigh [Berber] Youth Movement 
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